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Abstract  22 
Sudden losses to food production -shocks- and their consequences across land and sea pose 23 
cumulative threats to global sustainability.  We conduct an integrated assessment of global 24 
production data from crop, livestock, aquaculture, and fisheries sectors over 53 years to 25 
understand how shocks occurring in one food sector can create diverse and linked challenges 26 
among others. We show that some regions are shock hotspots, exposed frequently to shocks 27 
across multiple sectors. Critically, shock frequency has increased through time on land and 28 
sea at a global scale. Geopolitical and extreme-weather events were the main shock drivers 29 
identified, although with considerable differences across sectors. We illustrate how social-30 
ecological drivers, influenced by dynamics of the food system, can spillover multiple food 31 
sectors and create synchronous challenges or trade-offs among terrestrial and aquatic systems. 32 
In a more shock-prone and interconnected world, bold food policy and social protection 33 
mechanisms that help people anticipate, cope and recover from losses will be central to 34 
sustainability.    35 
Main 36 
Food production shocks pose significant challenges for the UN Sustainable Development 37 
Goals (SDGs)1 because of their potential to disrupt food supply and security, livelihoods, and 38 
human well-being2–7. A wide range of social-ecological pressures on food systems can drive 39 
shocks through direct or indirect mechanisms. For example, droughts or floods can rapidly 40 
increase mortality of crops, livestock, or farmed fish; whereas sudden outbreaks of violent 41 
conflict may prevent farmers or fishers accessing their production systems7,8. Prolonged 42 
overfishing can also produce unexpected, sudden losses in catch as exploited fish populations 43 
are pushed toward ecological tipping points, after which stock collapse occurs9. People’s 44 
vulnerability to shock events rests on their capacity to adapt, the scale and frequency of 45 
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shocks, and their dependence on the affected sector10. Given millions of people worldwide 46 
simultaneously depend on agricultural and seafood sectors for food and livelihoods11,12, 47 
understanding national vulnerabilities to shocks requires a complete picture of exposure 48 
across sectors on land and sea. Yet studies on food production shocks to date largely deal 49 
with agricultural and seafood commodities in isolation2,7,13. Integrated understanding is 50 
required to assess cumulative risks to sustainability across all food sectors in the face of 51 
environmental change and human population growth. 52 
We investigate historical global trends in exposure to and drivers of food production shocks 53 
across crop, livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture sectors from 1961 – 2013. We use an 54 
established, standardised approach to identify shocks and their drivers in national production 55 
data taken from the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and other published 56 
sources. Using local regression models, we identify shocks through breaks in the 57 
autocorrelation structure of a time-series, and couple detection with a literature review of in-58 
country events at the shock point. We map global shock frequency and co-occurrence and 59 
highlight the different ways shocks can permeate multiple food production sectors or drive 60 
trade-offs across them.  61 
Global trends in food production shocks 62 
From 741 available food production time-series (crops = 187, livestock = 190, fisheries = 202, 63 
aquaculture = 162), we detected 226 shocks across 134 nations. When pooled, we found 64 
agricultural sectors (crop and livestock) slightly more shock prone than aquatic sectors 65 
(fisheries and aquaculture) over the 53-year period (0.31 vs 0.29 shocks country-1 66 
respectively). Shock frequencies were regionally distinct within sectors, with some areas 67 
experiencing shocks far more frequently than others (Figure 1). Shock frequencies were 68 
highest in South Asia for crops (Figure 1a), the Caribbean for livestock (Figure 1b), Eastern 69 
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Europe for fisheries (Figure 1c), and South America for aquaculture sectors (Figure 1d). 70 
Importantly, some regions experienced high frequency in more than one sector. For example, 71 
South Asia experienced one of the highest shock frequencies to livestock as well as to crops, 72 
and the Caribbean experienced high frequency of fisheries shocks alongside livestock 73 
systems. Therefore, while there is varying exposure to production shocks within sectors, in 74 
several regions patterns of high shock frequency overlap and create areas of high cumulative 75 
exposure to production shocks across multiple fronts.  76 
The frequency of shocks has increased across all sectors at a global scale. In our results, 77 
annual shock frequencies fluctuated considerably over time, yet decadal averages, minima 78 
and maxima increased steadily from the 1960s and 70s (Figure 1e-h). We did not detect any 79 
shocks to aquaculture production until the early 1980s likely due to its nascence, but decadal 80 
shock rates have risen faster and to a level higher than in any other sector since (Figure 1h). 81 
Increasing shock frequency is a food security concern in itself. Conflict-related shocks across 82 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East since 2010 are responsible, combined with adverse 83 
climate conditions, for the first uptick in global hunger in recent times4. While the human 84 
impact of shocks depends on the degree to which livelihoods in a region or country depend 85 
on food production and the variation in vulnerability among households4, increased frequency 86 
reduces time for recovery between events. Smaller windows for recovery hinder coping 87 
strategies such as the accumulation of assets that can be sold during times of hardship, and 88 
can ultimately negatively influence the resilience of producers and communities to shocks4.  89 
Drivers of production shocks across land and sea 90 
Extreme weather events and geopolitical crises were the dominant drivers of shocks in our 91 
analysis, but the relative importance of drivers varied across sectors (Figure 2). Over half of 92 
all shocks to crop production systems were a result of extreme weather events (Figure 2), 93 
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largely drought, reinforcing the concern about vulnerability of arable systems to climatic and 94 
meteorological volatility across the globe14. We also found extreme weather to be a major 95 
driver of shocks to livestock (23%), particularly where reductions to feed occurred. For 96 
instance, severe summertime droughts in Mongolia in 2001 and 2010 reduced fodder and 97 
feed availability, compromised livestock condition, and led to mass mortality events during 98 
cold winter extremes15. Diseases such as foot and mouth also contributed to 10% of livestock 99 
shocks. Geopolitical crises, however, such as economic decentralisation in Europe or conflict 100 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, accounted for the greatest proportion (41%) of the livestock shocks in 101 
our analysis (Figure 2). 102 
In contrast, drivers of seafood production shocks were more diverse than for terrestrial 103 
systems (Figure 2). For fisheries, overfishing was responsible, at least in part, for 45% of 104 
shocks detected in landings data. However, geopolitical crises contributed to 23% of fisheries 105 
shocks, climate/weather events to 13% and policy changes to 11%. Shocks driven by policy 106 
changes can reflect positive interventions, but may also be a response to declining resources. 107 
In the aquaculture sector, while disease (included in ‘Other’ category) was the most common 108 
individual driver, responsible for 16% of shocks overall, a spectrum of geopolitical stressors 109 
were behind a third of aquaculture shocks, from state dissolution, to violent conflict, and 110 
declining competitiveness in export markets.  111 
Patterns of driver influence differed across regions (Supplementary Figure 1). For example, 112 
in South Asia, where agricultural shocks were most frequent, nearly all crop and livestock 113 
losses were driven by flood or drought. Whereas in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the greatest 114 
burden of hunger still persists4, geopolitical or economic crises were the leading drivers of 115 
agricultural shocks (Supplementary Figure 1). In seafood sectors, regional diversity of driver 116 
types was more consistent.  In wild systems, overfishing and geopolitical drivers contributed 117 
to numerous shocks across Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia. For aquaculture, 118 
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disease was the primary driver in Europe and Latin America, but geopolitical conditions were 119 
more significant for both East Asia or the Middle East and North Africa (Supplementary 120 
Figure 1). Therefore, while we highlight dominant shock drivers for each sector at a global 121 
scale, we reiterate that challenges for increasing food production will vary greatly from place 122 
to place. 123 
The reason for the increase in shock frequency through time across sectors is not clear, in part 124 
because many potential factors (including quality of reporting) have changed and increased 125 
over the time period. However, crop production shocks driven by extreme weather became 126 
more frequent in our results over time (Supplementary Figure 2). In livestock, fisheries and 127 
aquaculture sectors particularly, the diversity of drivers increased from the 1970s 128 
(Supplementary Figure 2). As food systems become increasingly globalised and 129 
interdependent, a greater diversity of exogenous shocks may influence them over time16. For 130 
instance, livestock disease is increasing globally, driven largely by a rapid rise in demand for 131 
meat, the incursion of livestock in natural systems, intense farming practices and the mass 132 
movement of animals and people17. The nature of interdependencies among sectors are also 133 
changing18. Demands for feed now tightly couple aquaculture to both capture fisheries and 134 
crop systems19, and the production challenges each of these encounter. Furthermore, financial 135 
institutions motivated by socioeconomic drivers disconnected from their geographies of 136 
influence, increasingly sway producer investments and decisions with complex or unknown 137 
consequences for production stability or sustainability20.  138 
Co-occurrence and spillover across terrestrial and aquatic sectors 139 
Climate events, violent conflict or other social-ecological stressors can create complex 140 
synchronous, or lagged effects across different systems4. Therefore, a single stressor could 141 
elicit numerous shocks across different food sectors but not always at the same time. So, 142 
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while we would not necessarily expect shocks from the same stressor to coincide at the exact 143 
shock point (year), we would assume to see clumping of shocks within broader time-periods. 144 
Co-occurrence appeared in our data from the early 1990s and more frequently in the latter 145 
half our time-series (Figure 3a). Of the 134 nations affected by shocks in our analysis, 22 of 146 
these experienced shocks in multiple sectors during the same five-year period (Figure 3b). 147 
We recognise these trends are influenced by the length of time intervals used in Figure 3 and 148 
further do not reflect changes in other sectors not detected as a shock (although they may be a 149 
response or a driver of shocks detected here). Overlapping shock occurrence in this way 150 
allows us to identify and further examine the more detailed conditions underpinning 151 
occurrence of multi-sectoral shocks. 152 
Shocks spanning multiple sectors were often driven by geopolitical events. For example, loss 153 
of Soviet-linked subsidies, and reduced export markets in Albania during the fall of 154 
communism resulted in large declines in crop, fisheries, and aquaculture production21–23. 155 
North Korea experienced lagged impacts from economic fall-out from USSR dissolution by 156 
the mid-1990s, and extreme flooding exacerbated the scale of production losses on land. The 157 
resulting famine led to the deaths over 200,000 people24,25. In Mali, internal conflict from 158 
2011 onwards displaced farmers and fishermen alike by limiting access to rivers and farms 159 
directly, or through disruption to supply chains26. Nonetheless, the geography of the shock, 160 
the magnitude of the driver, the importance of the affected systems for national production, 161 
and the adaptive (e.g. coping strategies), absorptive (e.g. reserves, assets, capital), or 162 
transformative capacities (e.g. governance mechanisms)4  of affected communities will all 163 
influence how a shock manifests across different food systems. Taking further examples from 164 
Figure 3, we illustrate how the social-ecological dynamics of both the country and the shock 165 
can yield variable responses across sectors (Figure 4).  166 
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Drivers of shocks can create similar or opposing responses in production across multiple 167 
sectors, revealing links between terrestrial and aquatic systems. In both Kuwait (Figure 4a) 168 
and Afghanistan (Figure 4b), different shock drivers at different scales created similar 169 
national-level responses spanning terrestrial and aquatic production.  The invasion of Kuwait 170 
by Iraq in late 1990 and the subsequent conflict with the US and allies was a huge nationwide 171 
disturbance, caused widespread devastation to agricultural land and the removal of the 172 
majority of Kuwaiti fishing vessels ceased commercial fishing27. Rapid declines in crop, 173 
livestock and fisheries production occurred from 1990, with shocks detected in both livestock 174 
and fisheries time-series (Figure 4a). In Afghanistan, a severe drought from 2000 – 2002 175 
decimated cereal production particularly in the country’s north. Large increases in animal 176 
diseases and reduced fodder severely affected production for pastoralists28 and we detected a 177 
shock to fisheries landings at the same point (Figure 4b). The similar declines across sectors 178 
disguise the differences in vulnerability however. Disturbances at the scale of the Gulf War 179 
are rare events, whereas droughts are frequent across Western Asia. In Afghanistan, its 180 
landlockedness and the absence of marine fisheries leaves national food production more 181 
vulnerable to drought.  182 
In contrast, divergent responses to extreme weather in Dominica illustrate the potential for 183 
land-sea trade-offs when human adaptation measures shift resource use across sectors. 184 
Repeated damage to farmland from tropical storms during the 1970s pushed more of the 185 
nation’s farmers into fishing for a primary income source29. After Hurricane David decimated 186 
the banana crop in 1979, fisheries landings increased dramatically from 1980, followed by a 187 
rapid decline in 1983 (Figure 4c), likely driven by overfishing leading to stock collapse in 188 
nearshore waters29. Shifts between land and sea following a shock were rare in our analysis of 189 
national time series. It is possible Dominica’s small size, and high dependence on a single 190 
crop for livelihoods of the rural poor (who have few absorptive strategies for coping with 191 
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crises)30, contributed to this response. However, it is likely these switches occur much more 192 
widely at smaller scales given the prevalence of joint dependence on fisheries and agriculture 193 
worldwide11 and because small-scale fisheries are often used to buffer the effects of extreme 194 
events31.  195 
In Ecuador, shocks occurred at similar points in both crop and aquaculture systems with 196 
seemingly unrelated proximate drivers if investigated solely from single sector perspectives 197 
(Figure 4d). The strong El-Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) event of 1998 led to 198 
widespread flood damage to croplands across Ecuador32 detected as a shock in our time-199 
series, and at the same time, a large reduction in coastal fisheries landings occurred (Figure 200 
4d), although not detected as shock due to the variable nature of the Humboldt system2. 201 
While there were reports of flood damages to shrimp farms in 1998, two years later we 202 
detected a shock to aquaculture production because of dramatic declines in the shrimp 203 
industry. These declines are consistent with the reports of a white-spot syndrome outbreak, 204 
which severely affected the industry in 200033. We could find no documented link of the El-205 
Niño event and the disease outbreak; however, abnormally warm coastal waters on the 206 
Pacific South American coast are associated with both El-Niño events and the rapid spread of 207 
the White-spot Syndrome virus34. Irrespective of whether these shocks are connected or not, 208 
an increased co-occurrence because of linked or independent drivers becomes problematic for 209 
communities with a reduced capacity to deal with these dual impacts.  210 
Challenges and potential for sustainable development in a shock-prone world 211 
Shocks across multiple sectors pose significant threats to improving global food security as 212 
well as other sustainability targets. For example, one target within SDG 2 of zero hunger, is 213 
to strengthen adaptive capacity in the face of climate change and extreme events1. For many 214 
people, livelihood diversification between agriculture and fisheries is a key strategy in 215 
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alleviating the impacts of production shortfalls11,35,36 yet shocks across multiple sectors 216 
compromise these options. A lack of viable alternatives can drive people to derive food or 217 
income from other sources with unpredictable sustainability consequences. The declines in 218 
large mammal populations in West Africa during times of low fish supply or after the 219 
collapse of agricultural systems in the Soviet Union are clear examples37,38. Trade-offs across 220 
sectors like this including the example from Dominica (Figure 4c) present significant 221 
challenges for achieving other sustainability targets. Unpredictable shifts among sectors 222 
create interactions among the goals for life on land, life below water or responsible 223 
production and consumption1 for instance. Further, as shock rates increase across all sectors 224 
the capacity for shocks to co-occur increases simultaneously. 225 
On a global scale, increased shock frequency may pose a threat to the resilience of the global 226 
food system through impacts on trade. Nearly a quarter of food, agricultural land, and 227 
freshwater resources are accessed through trade6 and a number of countries are dependent on 228 
imports to meet the food demands of their population39. Trade dependency is also becoming 229 
more regionally specialised, with some major breadbaskets the sole suppliers of commodities 230 
to other nations. For example, Thailand currently provides over 96% of rice imports to a 231 
number of West African countries40. The high dependence on just a handful of producers for 232 
some countries highlights future vulnerability. Producing countries often reduce or ban 233 
exports during production crises to protect domestic supply, endangering import-dependent 234 
trade partners5,6,39,40. If shock frequencies continue to increase and major producing nations 235 
are affected, a shift to a state of reduced exports is plausible at a global level. Increased 236 
commodity prices linked to global scarcity would favor higher paying nations40, leaving low-237 
income, trade-dependent countries in jeopardy. In the case that a higher frequency of shocks 238 
is influencing the stability of trade, we might expect to see increased temporal variability in 239 
11 
 
either trade or price data. Whether or not these signals are present in the available data 240 
warrants further investigation.  241 
Country-level differences in vulnerability to external or domestic production shocks mean 242 
challenges posed by them are uneven across regions and commodities. For example, frequent 243 
shocks in small Caribbean livestock sectors will have variable consequences across the 244 
different regional economies, yet a shock in major producers such as Argentina may 245 
influence supply for multiple trade-partners around the world41. Comparing across 246 
commodities, frequent or severe crop shocks in major breadbaskets such as South Asia can 247 
have far reaching consequences for global food availability and access5 but relatively small 248 
shocks to fish landings in small-island developing states may have equally negative effects on 249 
nutrition12,42. The diverse sources of threat across land and sea from domestic or foreign 250 
sources highlights a pressing need to improve resilience to shocks in both agricultural and 251 
seafood sectors.   252 
Building resilience at a global level will require more proactive national food and trade 253 
policies. Investing in climate-smart food systems that exploit ecosystem services to mitigate 254 
extreme-events will be increasingly important43. For instance, increasing diversity of plant 255 
and animal breeds/varieties can minimise vulnerability to disease; integrating agroforestry 256 
into farm systems and enhancing soil quality can improve recovery times after drought and 257 
floods3,43. Concerted efforts should be made in import-dependent countries to build domestic 258 
food reserves to buffer the effects of supply losses when trade partners reduce exports during 259 
production shocks6. Moreover, international trade policies should aim to disincentivise 260 
behaviours that exacerbate the impacts of production shocks such as commodity hoarding and 261 
export bans. Such policy is especially important for major food producers such as the USA, 262 
India, or China, whose trade networks have greater global influence on food supply6. 263 
Maintaining fair and open trade should be made a priority in addressing global hunger. 264 
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In shock-prone areas, a number of social protection mechanisms will be key. These 265 
mechanisms may help nations, communities and households prevent and anticipate shocks, 266 
cope with them and recover4. For example, conflict-related shocks remain the biggest barrier 267 
to food security in the world’s most food insecure regions4,7. Greater understanding of the 268 
causes of conflict in different areas is central to prevention4. New early-warning systems for 269 
violence are already underway44. During times of crisis, timely food and cash transfers, and 270 
food or cash for work programmes show promise throughout Sub-Saharan Africa45.  For 271 
those displaced, to speed up recovery and close yield gaps, participatory planning and post-272 
conflict support such as tools, seeds or skills training is crucial 4,46. Weather-indexed 273 
insurance is another innovative tool to protect producers against loss of income or food 274 
access during adverse conditions47, and will be particularly important if extreme events 275 
become more frequent48.   276 
Increased investment in food systems research to improve resilience to shocks is urgently 277 
required under climate change. Continued development of drought and pest-related resistance 278 
in key crops is crucial49 but understanding and addressing barriers to uptake in food-insecure 279 
countries is equally important50. The same applies where fish-farming could increase 280 
resilience to external shocks in vulnerable nations42 but barriers that limit industry growth 281 
must be overcome. In commercial-scale aquaculture systems, improvements in open data and 282 
new sequencing technologies can help us understand the microbial conditions surrounding 283 
disease emergence, which is fundamental to meeting increasing global seafood demands51. 284 
Without learning to mitigate and adapt to the effects of increased volatility in food systems, 285 
global goals to end hunger and protect our natural ecosystems may be out of reach.  286 
Trends discussed here almost certainly underrepresent the frequency of production shocks. 287 
Aggregation of production data to country level smooths out sudden production losses that 288 
are locally isolated or restricted to a single food type. This is particularly true in large 289 
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countries such as the United States of America or Australia where food is grown over large 290 
and diverse landscapes. Small-scale, unreported food systems (e.g. some inland and marine 291 
fisheries or aquaculture, backyard farm systems and wild meat sources) are also not included 292 
in the data used in this analysis. Although this is a recognised weakness, the data used here 293 
represents the best source of production data with global coverage across multiple sectors. 294 
Nevertheless, localised shocks or shocks to small-scale systems are still of concern for the 295 
livelihoods and food security of communities dependent on them.  296 
Achieving the SDGs by 2030 will require addressing drivers of food production shocks and 297 
derived threats. With shock frequency increasing across sectors, the likelihood of shock co-298 
occurrence increases, particularly in hotspots of shock exposure. Production challenges will 299 
be hardest felt by those with lower capacity to adapt to or absorb shocks. With extreme 300 
weather events predicted to increase into the future, potentially interacting with civil unrest, 301 
achieving food security in regions most exposed to shocks may hinge on successful social 302 
protection mechanisms to help people cope and recover. Fundamental shifts toward shock-303 
resilient food systems will require considerable but achievable change to how we grow and 304 
trade food. Integrating and understanding links between land and sea will be critical for 305 
programmes and research aiming to affect progress towards food security and sustainable 306 
development. 307 
Methods 308 
To identify and compare shock occurrence among fundamentally different systems 309 
(agriculture and seafood), we adopt the paired statistical and qualitative approach of Gephart 310 
et al2. This method identifies shocks through breaks in the autocorrelation structure of a time-311 
series and combines this with a literature search for likely driver of the shock.  Alternative 312 
studies have used pre-published data sets on extreme events to understand responses in 313 
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production data31, however this skews focus toward drivers with plentiful data – often 314 
terrestrial and biophysical events such as floods, droughts, or cold fronts. Others have also 315 
used the trade in virtual water to study shocks in agricultural systems13, but this largely 316 
eliminates the marine component of our food system. Reliance on statistical detection in 317 
production data avoids specificity making it a standardised approach applicable across crop, 318 
livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture sectors. 319 
Data Sources 320 
We use a range of food production data from the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization 321 
(FAO) combined with published production datasets for our analysis. We used crop and 322 
livestock data from FAOSTAT production quantity dataset 1961 – 2014 dataset 323 
(http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/)52. Crop types included cereals, coarse grains, fruits, roots and 324 
tubers, pulses, tree nuts and vegetables; while livestock included total meat, milk, and egg 325 
production from bovine, poultry, swine, mutton and goat sources. We used the FAO FishStat 326 
database53 for inland and marine aquaculture production, and inland fisheries landings data 327 
(1950 – 2015 Global Production dataset, www.fao.org/fishery/topic/166235/en.). We used 328 
marine fish landings data from Watson54 to account for estimates of large-scale, small-scale 329 
and illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) landings. Fisheries data included all landed 330 
finfish, crustaceans, and molluscs. Aquaculture data included all farmed finfish, crustaceans, 331 
molluscs and algae. While we recognise that underreporting of small-scale production across 332 
all sectors is a limitation of FAO data, it provides global coverage of production across 333 
multiple sectors, and the detection of shocks relies on overall trends in data rather than 334 
absolute production values. We obtained country shapefiles used for mapping global patterns 335 
from Natural Earth (https://www.naturalearthdata.com/) and adapted EEZ shapefiles from 336 
Marine Regions (http://www.marineregions.org/)55. We performed all data analyses using R 337 
statistical software56. 338 
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Detecting shocks and identifying drivers 339 
For all countries we aggregated production to total annual values from 1961 – 2013 across all 340 
commodity types described above for crop, livestock, fisheries and aquaculture sectors. We 341 
fitted local polynomial regression (LOESS) models with a span of 0.6 to aggregated annual 342 
production data for all countries and sectors. We regressed model residuals against lag-1 343 
residuals, and any outliers in this regression (quantified as data points with a Cook’s 344 
distance > 0.3), we deemed shocks (Supplementary Figure 4). Given only production losses 345 
are of concern for food security, we only considered shock points associated with a loss in 346 
production relative to a previous 7-year median production baseline.  347 
Consistent with the approach by Gephart et al.2, for each shock detected we calculated the 348 
size of a shock and its recovery time for comparisons across sectors and regions 349 
(Supplementary Figure 1). Shock size equals the loss in production (in tonnes) relative to the 350 
previous 7-year median baseline. Recovery time for the shock is calculated as the number of 351 
years taken to increase back up to at least 95% of this baseline. Some shocks did not recover 352 
by the end of the time series and we highlight the individual shocks in Supplementary Table 1. 353 
We calculated shock frequencies for each geographical region, by dividing the number of 354 
shocks detected from 1961 – 2013 by the number of time-series used for detection. For 355 
annual shock frequencies, for every sector we divided the number of shocks detected for a 356 
given year by the number of countries producing in that year. This approach compensates for 357 
different numbers of countries within each region, and the increasing number of countries 358 
producing through time. 359 
Adopting a qualitative approach to identifying the drivers of production shocks helps account 360 
for and recognise the multiple and complex social-ecological factors contributing to an event. 361 
For a detected shock, we searched peer-reviewed and grey literature (e.g. NGO reports, news 362 
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articles etc.) for the likely causes, or drivers, of each individual shock. Each shock was 363 
assessed independently disaggregating production data into individual commodities to 364 
identify the species affected and check our analysis, which allowed greater specificity to our 365 
search. We only attributed a driver to a shock when our search returned a documented event 366 
or set of conditions where a negative effect on agricultural or seafood sectors (dependent on 367 
the sector affected) was explicitly mentioned at or just before the shock point (i.e. 368 
documentation stipulated the link rather than us establishing purely correlative trends). The 369 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods adopted by Gephart et al.2 provide 370 
complimentary approaches where purely data driven methods may highlight correlative 371 
relationships with drivers without causation. Likewise, purely qualitative analyses may be 372 
limited in their capacity to detect shocks because of differences in reporting across regions. 373 
We caution that this approach is not meant to provide a comprehensive list of contributing 374 
factors for a given shock within the data, but instead highlights potential drivers of change 375 
from the literature we identify. It is plausible that other unidentified factors contribute to the 376 
changes seen in the data. 377 
In our analysis, we classify drivers of shocks into five main categories. Climate/weather 378 
events include anomalies such as storms, droughts, ENSO events, or climate-driven 379 
ecosystem change. Geopolitical/economic events covers disturbances from conflict, state 380 
dissolution or financial crises. Mismanagement includes multiple categories such as 381 
overfishing in the ocean, or deforestation and erosion of soils on land. Policy change can 382 
refer to, for example, closure of a fishery or abolition of agricultural subsidies. The ‘Other’ 383 
category includes a wide range of pressures from production diseases to geological events 384 
such as tsunamis or volcanic eruptions. Due to the complex nature of social-ecological 385 
stressors on food systems, we combined many of these categories to explain the drivers of 386 
production shocks and highlight these sub-categories. The Unknown category contains 387 
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shocks for which we could not find a documented reason. It is possible that our statistical 388 
approach to detection means we identify changes to national reporting methods as a shock. 389 
This highlights the importance of the complimentary quantitative and qualitative approaches 390 
used here to identify if a statistical anomaly in production data is reflected by conditions or 391 
events reported in reality2. 392 
We do however acknowledge that some production losses detected may not be completely 393 
unanticipated. Some production losses driven by economic recession or policy changes may 394 
be expected by producers. However, to what extent the production losses detected here were 395 
anticipated is unclear because of data scarcity. Policy responses to dwindling resources can 396 
certainly produce shocks to food supply and livelihoods, as exemplified in the closure and 397 
subsequent anger surrounding the North-West Atlantic cod fishery in 199357. But even if an 398 
event is anticipated, the scale of disruption may be unknown (the uncertainty surrounding the 399 
economic impacts of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union is a contemporary 400 
example).  While the uncertainty surrounding whether a statistical shock in production data 401 
equates to a shock in reality is a limitation, this method does allow non-biased detection of 402 
shocks caused by drivers for which there is scant data (e.g. sudden declines from fish stock 403 
collapse). Although sensitivity analyses of Cook’s distance, LOESS span or production 404 
baseline parameters provided confidence intervals, we may not have detected all shocks 405 
(Supplementary Figure 3). Further, the shock detection method described here is less 406 
sensitive to production changes in highly variable systems where large fluctuations are 407 
common within the time series2.   408 
Data availability 409 
Crop and livestock production data were accessed through FAOSTAT 410 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/. For marine fisheries production we used the published dataset 411 
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by Watson54 at https://www.nature.com/articles/sdata201739.  Aquaculture and inland 412 
fisheries data were extracted from global production datasets using FishStat software 413 
(www.fao.org/fishery/topic/166235/en). All code and data products used for analyses in this 414 
study are publicly available through a Github repository (https://github.com/cottrellr/shocks). 415 
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Figure 1 – Spatial (a-d) and temporal (e-g) trends in food production shock frequency in 
crop, livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture sectors from 1961-2013. Regions include North 
America, Central America, Caribbean, South America, Northern Europe, Western Europe, 
Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, 
East Africa, Western Asia, South Asia, East Asia, South-east Asia, Melanesian, Micronesia, 
Australia and New Zealand, and Polynesia. The red line in the time series indicates the 
annual shock frequency from the shocks identified in this study. Light grey confidence 
interval describes the plausible range of frequencies under different combinations of LOESS 
model span (0.2-0.8), production baseline durations (3,5,7, or 9 years) and average types used 
for baseline (mean or median). Dashed black line is the decadal mean of the red line and the 
dark grey band is the decadal minima and maxima of the confidence interval.     
Figure 2 – Drivers of food production shocks for crop, livestock, fisheries and 
aquaculture sectors.  
Figure 3 – Heat map of shock co-occurrence across terrestrial and aquatic food sectors 
through time. a) Global extent of co-occurrence in all countries affected by shocks in our 
analysis grouped by subregion b) Isolated countries where shocks occurred across multiple 
sectors during the same five-year period.   
Figure 4 – Case studies of shock spillover, trade-offs, and co-occurrence across 
terrestrial and aquatic sectors. a) Invasion of Kuwait during the Gulf War b) Severe 
drought in Afghanistan c) Land-sea switches following Hurricane David in Dominica d) El-
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